

himself is out of joint with the time, feeling his discontent now, at the very moment when all the louring clouds are 'in the deep bosom of the ocean buried'²

At a time when historicism as a method is frequently critiqued as an outmoded and limiting mode of literary scholarship, Schwyzer's study wonderfully achieves its goal of making readers 'think more deeply about what it means to set and see a work of art within its historical context' (p. 5). Its concept of history is fluid and dynamic and its attention to both historical detail and textual nuance is exemplary.

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1 William Shakespeare, *Richard III*, ed. Thomas Cartelli (New York, 2009), I.i.6.

2 *Ibid.*, I.i.4.

Bradin Cormack, Martha C. Nussbaum and Richard Strier (eds), *Shakespeare and the Law: A Conversation among Disciplines and Professions*, University of Chicago Press, 2013, pp. 335, \$35/£24.50.

Law, the legal system and the operation of justice at local, regional and national levels figured prominently in early modern England. This was a litigious age, scarcely less, it seems, than present-day America. Shakespeare himself was involved in court cases, lived for a time near the Inns of Court in London and wrote plays and acted for an audience that included members of the legal profession in its different branches. Unsurprisingly, therefore, law is a recurring topic in his drama and helped shape his plots and characterisation. It also influenced, engaged and challenged his thinking and impacted on his conceptual framework and vocabulary. Hamlet famously soliloquises about lawyers and the tricks of their profession in Act V, Scene I. Trials and mock trials feature in *A Winter's Tale* and *King Lear*. The use and abuse of the law are central to the unfolding plot of *Measure for Measure*. Shylock and Portia memorably confront each other in *The Merchant of Venice* over the enforcement of contract law in a commercial society. Othello, at the start of the play, profits from a legal judgement in his favour (over his elopement and marriage with Desdemona) but takes the law into his own hands in Act V by acting as judge and, indeed, executioner. The law of succession lies at the heart of *Macbeth*. The examples could easily be multiplied. Equally unsurprisingly, this subject is one that has already attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, especially in the USA. Paul Clarkson and Clyde Warren blazed a trail with their book on *The Law of Property in Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama* (Baltimore, 1942). Daniel J. Kornstein's *Kill all the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal* (Princeton, 1994) and, most recently, Andrew Zurcher's *Shakespeare and Law* (London, 2010) stand out among later contributions. Some collections of essays addressing the subject have also been published in the last few years.¹ Specialised studies of this kind have been supplemented by more general works such as Luke Wilson's *Theaters of Intention: Drama and Law in Early Modern England* (Stanford, 2000) and Subha Mukherji's *Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge, 2006).

Shakespeare and the Law, the volume being reviewed here, stems from a 2009 conference at the University of Chicago, a major centre in the 'Law and Literature' movement in the USA and is aimed chiefly at an American audience – the term MP is defined for their benefit on p. 234. The colloquium brought together academics in the fields of law, literature and philosophy (many of them from Chicago), as well as a number of high-ranking judges

or former judges. Play-readings in which some of the speakers took part comprised part of the proceedings and the same individuals gathered at the end for a round-table discussion of issues raised during the event. The result is a highly miscellaneous collection of essays, which is not interdisciplinary in the strict sense but rather a set of encounters and conversations between contributors of different backgrounds and with different starting points and agendas. It represents a cluster of approaches to a loosely defined subject. The essayists move in and out of the plays. Diane Wood, for example, briefly takes stock of five of Shakespeare's plays and the playwright's insights into jurisprudence to extract usable lessons about enforcement, clemency and executive intervention for today's judges. That said, Charles Fried (one of the academic lawyer contributors) makes clear that twenty-first-century American justice is far from monolithic: the 'sterner' law of New York is contrasted with the 'looser disposition' in the 'sunnier clime' of California and the 'Robin Hood dispositions' of Louisiana and Texas (p. 156). But this volume is miscellaneous in other senses too. The contributions vary considerably in length. The endnotes to Richard Strier's paper occupy as many pages as the text of Richard Posner's and Charles Fried's contributions. Some of the essays, like Daniel Brudney's opening piece, which examines similarities and differences between literary and legal texts, the 'authority' they command and strategies of interpretation, are methodological in a broad sense. By contrast, Kathy Eden's essay on 'Liquid Fortification and the Law in *King Lear*' focuses chiefly on just two words, 'loyal' and 'royal', to explore Shakespeare's 'experimental philology' (p. 207). Many of the essayists do not range very far from the texts they are scrutinising. Rather strikingly, however, Martha Nussbaum's discussion of Brutus's idealistic appeal to the people of Rome in *Julius Caesar* invokes comparisons with the American Revolution and with Gandhi and Nehru in 1947 and makes some telling historiographical points about Sir Ronald Syme's classic history of *The Roman Revolution*, published on the very eve of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. Some of the contributions contain an autobiographical component. Veteran Harvard Emeritus Professor Stanley Cavell, for instance, draws on his own Jewish background – he was then called Goldstein – and his own high school experience of anti-Jewish prejudices to assist him in exploring Venice's dealings with Shylock.

The fourteen essays that comprise this book are grouped together in four thematic sections. While this is obviously useful in some ways in providing a workable overall structure, the downside is that discussion of the same plays from different perspectives crops up in several places. *Measure for Measure* and *The Merchant of Venice*, not unexpectedly, recur many times and receive most attention. Inevitably, there is much repetition. Only one chapter, however, that by Marie Theresa O'Connor, addresses *Cymbeline* and links it to law cases that tested the realities of the new Anglo-Scottish Union after 1603. Richard Strier focuses chiefly on the different representations of justice in *Henry IV pt. 2*, the only writer here to do so.

Not all the contributors stick strictly to their brief: law does not always self-evidently occupy centre stage in these essays. Some of the papers suffer from what might easily be described as self-indulgent endnote mania. It is not altogether clear what point is served by including a verbatim transcript of the end-of-day, often depressingly banal, 'round-table' discussion. This clearly spiralled out of control as topics as unconnected as Gertrude's sexuality in *Hamlet* and Shakespeare and music were introduced and as contributors were asked to nominate the Shakespearean character they identified with most closely. Judge Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court – the 'star' of the Chicago conference – opines at the end that discussing Shakespeare 'just might help us to be better law students or better judges' (p. 322). No doubt the transcript will remind the contributors they had a good time

and that even their bantering with each other and bad jokes produced laughter and applause – the record tells us so! The chief criticism, however, to which this volume lays itself open relates to the prose style of some of the contributions, where both academics and practising judges seem determined to outbid each other in pomposity and unreadability. Radicals in the mid-seventeenth-century English Revolution led a vigorous campaign for the reform of the English legal system, demanding, amongst other things, that it be conducted in plain English. There is a moral here for today's 'Law and Literature' movement in the USA.

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1 Paul Ruffield and Gary Watt (eds), *Shakespeare and the Law* (Oxford, 2008) and Constance Jordan and Karen Cunningham (eds), *The Law in Shakespeare* (Basingstoke, 2007).

Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales*, University of Chicago Press, 2013, pp. xv + 290, £18.

Packed in the guts between the 'Face' and the 'Tail' of Laurie Shannon's *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* is a critique of Cartesian dualism unlike any that one might expect in a work of animal studies. Shannon's approach ultimately is not to argue from epistemological or ontological grounds, although her discussions of Descartes and Montaigne are rich in both areas. Instead, the force of the critique comes from compelling historical evidence attesting to an early modern cosmopolitical dispensation premised on the recognition of animals as political subjects. When Shannon writes that the book 'tracks a particular tradition that accommodates the presence of animals and conceives them as actors and stakeholders endowed by their creator with certain subjective interests' (p. 18), the trace of foundational political language shows her often playful style but it also signals animals' serious claim to political stakeholdership, even if they are not on equal footing with humans. Shannon thus challenges Giorgio Agamben's assertion of the necessary exclusion of 'the animal' in the foundation of human biopolitics. While we get a sense from *The Accommodated Animal* of the animal subjectivity lost in the advent of the human/animal divide, we also see possibilities for reconceiving current notions of animal rights.

According to Shannon, two realms of knowledge supported the early modern dispensation: the hexameron and natural history (the respective topics of Chapters One and Two). In studying the hexamer texts, Shannon treats Genesis as a zootopian constitution, applying to it an analysis that finds certain entitlements and dominions granted to animals. Such notions found early modern poetic currency in the English translation of Guillaume Du Bartas's *Bartas: His Devine Weekes and Workes* (1605). Meanwhile, natural history promotes animal capacity for locomotion as the basis of decision, which in turn is 'fundamental to conceptions of political capacity' (p. 100).

While the first two chapters treat 'cognizable forms of animal stakeholdership', the third and fourth give 'cultural traction to a zoographically comparative measure of man, unleashing a skeptical spirit against his claims for "preeminence"' (p. 4). The chapters feature negations of the human exceptionalism that would, in Cartesian duality, set humans apart from and above animals. Shannon's research is important in demonstrating that claims for unqualified human dominion did not go unchallenged in the period. King Lear's lament for 'unaccommodated man' speaks directly to the 'human negative exceptionalism' – the lack of natural provisioning for humankind – that subverts human claims to preeminence

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